Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/655

639 improvement in the author's manner of presentation. He does not express his thoughts as clearly, simply, and emphatically as one could wish. His sentences are often long and involved, he has a tendency to be somewhat too profuse, and he is overfond of technical terms. But his well-chosen and suggestive illustrations assist one materially in surmounting difficulties.

Dr. Simmers general estimate of the science of ethics is significant, and should be taken to heart. Ethics, he believes, has reached the turning point which all sciences had to pass; it now begins to describe the particular facts, it is no longer dominated by the rule of general concepts. "In other words, ethics leaves the philosophical stage, from which it, like other sciences, started out, and to which, indeed, it clung somewhat longer than other disciplines." Dr. Simmel is right The scientific ethics of today is profiting by the example of other branches of learning; it is becoming inductive. Its business is to study moral phenomena without regard to practical considerations; it strives to reach a theory of morality, not an evaluation of the same. First the facts, then the general concepts based on these facts! To be sure, the a priori element cannot, with impunity, be ignored here any more than in physical science. Induction alone is not enough; we need to explain the laws we reach, and to give them orderly arrangement. It is impossible, of course, to give a resumé of the contents of a book like Dr. Simmel's. One would have to offer all the criticisms of concepts which the author makes. The following may serve as a crude exemplification of his method. In discussing Kant's categorical imperative, he first endeavors to discover the exact meaning of the notion. The imperative: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law," serves a double purpose. It describes the form which characterizes the objective side of moral acts, and at the same time gives us the psychological motive for the fulfillment of the law, thus furnishing us with the criterion of subjective morality. For morality consists not merely in doing one's duty, but in doing it because it is one's duty. Now, why should Kant lay such stress on the performance of duty for duty's sake; why should he find in this the very kernel of morality? Simply because the ends of morality will be the better subserved, if the agent executes an act for its own sake and not for the sake of its quality or consequences. In the latter case, there is always some danger of nonfulfillment. A reliable disposition to perform moral acts must be formed, and this can be done only in case duty is regarded as an end in itself. There can be no doubt that this is a satisfactory explanation of the 'duty for duty's sake' formula. It agrees, I believe, with Leslie Stephen's account of it.

The categorical imperative has also a logical meaning. In order that an act be judged as moral, it must be able to be thought as a universal act Dr. Simmel does not see the logical connection between the first and second part of the law. From the formula, 'do your duty for duty's sake,' it does