Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/629

613 pantheism on page 150. On page 170 we read: "We, the finite, require the presence of a non-ego beyond us, in order to self-consciousness. This is a condition of the self-consciousness of the finite; but it is surely conceivable that the Infinite may dispense with this condition because of its infinity." But yet two pages further on we are told that "if God possesses consciousness, there must to him be not only a subject knowing, but also an object known. ... A subject without an object would not be conscious of anything," and there is nothing in the context to modify the discrepancy between these views.

It is perhaps the illusory character of the intuitive evidence on which the author puts his main dependence that gives the work as a whole such an air of incoherence. The literary tone of the book is excellent. While it contains little that is original or new to the mature student, the beginner will find it a pretty complete summary of the difficulties in the theistic problem, and, however strongly one may feel that the constructive effort fails of reaching the desired goal, there is much that is suggestive and stimulating to positive thought. There is plenty of excellent material offered, only the central synthetic principle is lacking.

Mr. Bonham's book is professedly written from the standpoint of modern science. In his work on "Industrial Liberty," which appeared about six years ago, he showed himself an earnest disciple of Herbert Spencer. The present volume evinces the same general characteristics; at times, however, the radicalism of the author leads him to reject some of Mr. Spencer's most cherished views. This is especially true concerning the value to be placed upon the conception of the Unknowable. The writer agrees that science points unmistakably to an Ultimate Power back of phenomena. He insists, however, that it is not only unscientific, but unfruitful of any moral result, to clothe our conclusions with reference to the fact of such an existence beyond the bound of our reason with any such sense of reverence as the term religion implies. To make that of which we can know nothing the ground of religion, is to him the height of absurdity. Mr. Bonham holds that impersonal surroundings, and not discursive argument, is the most potent influence in the intellectual progress of the masses, and determines their views upon theology.