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610 ," that the affective and presentative elements are uniformly conjoined. Yet in treating of the 'abstract sentiments,' he says that "the exercise of each of the intellectual functions, discrimination and assimilation, has its own affective accompaniment" [II, p. 128]. This statement would seem to indicate that the presentative element in 'relational emotions' is the mind's consciousness of its own activity in the exercise of one of its functions. But the consciousness of activity is as such not a presentative phenomenon according to Mr. Sully. In the section on "Characteristics of Conation," he tells us that "Our consciousness of activity is based upon the common peculiarities of our muscular sensibility." He does not, however, agree with Münsterberg in " viewing active experiences merely as a group of presentative elements or sensations." Active consciousness is an aspect, a peculiar characteristic, of muscular sensations, quite apart from their aspect as presentatives and wholly sui generis. Even in attention "the characteristic psychical factor" is contributed by muscular action [I, p. 148]. We are therefore obliged to conclude either that there is no presentative phenomenon to which the feeling, e.g., of logical consistency is attached, or else that the said feeling accompanies the presentative aspect of muscular sensation. No clue to a solution is furnished by the author. Mr. Sully holds to the 'efferent' theory of muscular sensation, and mentions Wundt as its chief supporter: an error which has been long since corrected.

In general, it may be said of The Human Mind that it is one of those books which have a recognized place in the literature of every science: a fair and tolerably complete statement of fact, erring only on the side of conservatism, with no battles to fight, and feeling not too heavily the burden of unsolved problems. Its altitude on disputed questions is, as its author says with regard to the 'muscular sense,' 'conciliatory.' All this, of course, is quite as it should be in a text-book. One could, however, wish that a fuller statement and criticism of extreme views had more frequently preceded their rejection.

Those who are acquainted with Professor Knight's Studies in Philosophy and Literature (1879) and with his admirable work as editor of the Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, will welcome with