Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/445

429 AFFECTIVE ATTENTION. PROFESSOR SULLY, in The Human Mind, has explicitly, though not very consistently or energetically, raised the question whether it is possible to attend to the pleasure-pain process, or whether the "object" of attention is always sensa- tional (sensation, perception, idea, etc.). "Objects of atten- tion," he says,1 "are either sensations and their combinations, sensation-complexes, or what we call ideas or representations, e.g., the idea or mental image of a color." And again : 2 "Attention in its simplest form is to be conceived on its sub- jective side as a kind of mental reaction upon a sensation already partially excited by the proper peripheral process of stimulation." But: 3 "No doubt . . . there is an element of attention in ... affective observation or contemplation ; but since the need of intellectual elaboration is done away with, the attention becomes relatively easy and spontaneous." And : 4 "We can intensify a pain or a pleasure by attending to it as such." This is not altogether self-consistent. But I suppose that the writer's general theory would be something like this. A sensation is the correlate of a definite stimulation-process. It has thousands of qualities, separate and distinct. It, therefore, is the primary and more usual object of attention. An affec- tion, on the other hand, is the correlate of a diffused excitation- process. 5 It has only two root-qualities, pleasure and pain. 6 Attention to it is, therefore, something less frequent and less sharply characterized than attention to sensation ; but it is a possible and actually realized process. In the same way we may have, an attention to volition; 7 though, as volition has only one quality, 8 the process becomes vaguer still, tends to be swamped by voluntary movement,, and is therefore not often noticed. It is this position which I propose to examine. 1 I, p. 143. 2 Loc.cit. 3 II, p. 12. 4 I, p. 77. 5 II, pp. 11, 12. 6 I, p. 65. 7 I, p. 77. 8 I, p. 67.