Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/435

419 desire,—their inequality for the same man and for different men. One man will sacrifice horses and dogs for antique gems, another will sacrifice antique gems for horses and dogs. The general standard does not oblige one to recognize any such difference, or rather it obliges one not to recognize any such difference on pain of moral paralysis. For one's duty in the matter of the general standard is to take the line of conduct which under the given circumstances will satisfy the most desire, every desire disappointed being an offset against an equivalent satisfaction. So long as all the desires to be taken into consideration belong to the same person there will be no difficulty. One line of conduct will disappoint him in one way and gratify him in another, another line of conduct will disappoint him in some other way and gratify him in still another. Which of the two lines he would prefer, he can easily tell, or one who knows him may tell for him; or if the balance stands even between them, it is no great matter which is chosen. But suppose that the lines of conduct to be selected from cause disappointment to one person and gratification to any other, and disappointment in one thing and gratification in another, then how does the general standard help one to decide? If one desire, no matter which one or whose, is to be taken as the equal of any other desire, no matter which one or whose; and if the satisfaction of a desire is to be taken as the equivalent of the disappointment of a desire, then there is no difficulty. It may be hard in a given case to ascertain all the desires which the several lines of conduct will respectively satisfy and disappoint, but that is a difficulty in applying the theory, and not a hitch in the theory itself. But suppose one denies that the desire for hair-powder is the equivalent of the desire for food, and questions the equality of a gratification and disappointment, and inclines to the opinion that the desires of one person are much keener than those of another; can one decide according to the general standard and recognize all these distinctions? To do so he must have some means of certifying how much keener one man's desires are than another's; whether A's desire for hair-powder is not, in fact, more than the