Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/431

415 in various ways; that the ideal for Jones is to have all his desires gratified, including those that other people should be gratified and disappointed in various ways; and so on. There would appear to be not one ideal, but as many ideals as there are individuals. Good would seem to mean a different thing in reference to every different person; would seem to mean in reference to me, what is capable of ministering to my desires, and in reference to Jones, what is capable of ministering to his desires, and so on. Or, since the capability of anything to minister to one's desires depends upon one's tastes, good means in reference to me what suits my tastes, and in reference to Jones what suits his tastes, and so on. A thing which suits one person and does not suit another, is both good and bad, but in different senses. A thing which suits two people is good twice over, but in different senses. As moral conduct on this theory is simply a certain kind of good conduct, there are as many senses of the word moral as of the word good. Supposing that under given circumstances it is possible to do any one of several things, the conduct which is aimed at that one of those things which is most to my liking is under those circumstances par excellence the moral conduct, if the gratification of my desires is the ideal; and on this theory it is the ideal. But the gratification of Jones's desires is also the ideal; and what is most to my taste may be least to his. What is par excellence right under any given circumstances may be also par excellence wrong; one may be both obliged to do and not to do it, and with equal reason. As virtually every course of action is offensive to somebody and agreeable to some one else, there is hardly anything that one is not in duty bound both to do and not to do. There is almost no opportunity of doing one's duty, without violating other duties just as sacred. One's duty to please one's self is quite as sacred as one's duty to please anybody else. It is one's duty to do as one likes because one likes it; it is one's duty to do as some one else likes, or rather as any one else likes, for a corresponding reason.

I do not develop these consequences as a reproach to the