Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/430

414 that one had up to that time been ignorant of and could not therefore desire; that all things which are desired have come to be so only because and in so far as through one's own experience, or through the testimony of other people, one has come to believe them to be pleasurable; and that pleasure therefore is the true 'good-in-itself' or ultimate end. On the contrary, by parity of reasoning it is concluded that pain is the only thing that in and of itself is bad, that pain is the ultimate object of aversion. But the truth upon this and other controverted points it is not necessary for the present to consider; for except as otherwise stated the remarks to be made below apply equally to every one of the alternatives known to me upon these points.

Of these remarks the first is that the superstructure of the foregoing doctrine is too large for the foundation. Admitting that the satisfaction of a desire is good, the question arises, good for whom? Obviously for him who received the satisfaction, for him whose desire it was, let us say for me. The argument continues: if the satisfaction of one desire is good, the satisfaction of that and another one is better. But that depends on whose desire the second one is. If it is also mine, then no doubt it is true that the satisfaction of the two is better than that of either of them separately. The satisfaction of one desire of mine is good because I value it; the satisfaction of that and another one of mine is better for the like reason, because I value it more. But suppose that the second desire is Jones's, then who 'values it more'? I? If I do, it will be because I also desire to have Jones gratified; because that is a second desire of my own which is gratified. Otherwise I will not value it more. As the same reasoning applies to Jones, it follows that neither of us will value it more. It does not appear that if the satisfaction of one desire is good, the satisfaction of that and another one is better, and that the satisfaction of all the desires of everybody is the best conceivable. What does appear is, that the ideal for me is to have all my own desires gratified, including, of course, my desires that other people should be gratified and disappointed