Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/429

413 itself is good is the satisfaction of desire. Well, then, one may be supposed to argue, if the satisfaction of one desire is good, the satisfaction of that and another one is better, and the superlative degree of this sort of thing, the ideal best, is the satisfaction of all the desires of everybody. On the contrary, nothing in and of itself is bad but the realization of an aversion, or let us say, the disappointment of a desire. If the disappointment of one desire is bad, the disappointment of that and another desire is worse, and the worst is the disappointment of all desires. Of two things which are good, we may suppose our reasoner to continue, that which satisfies the more desires is the better. Of two things which are bad, that which disappoints the less desire is the better. And a thing which works both ways, which ministers to some desires and frustrates others, must be regarded as .on the whole good or bad according to the relative value of the desires which it respectively gratifies and disappoints. Conduct like everything else is to be estimated in this way. Good conduct in the narrowest sense of the word is simply action adapted to the end which the agent may have in view,—to lassoing a wild steer perhaps, or shooting down a sheriff's posse. Good conduct in a broader sense is that which tends to realize all the agent's desires taken as a whole. Good conduct, in the broadest sense, is that which tends to realize to the utmost not merely the agent's desires taken as a whole, but the desires of every one taken as a whole. It is in proportion as conduct approaches this ideal that it may be moral; it is in proportion as the agent intends it to approach this ideal that it is moral, and a moral injunction is simply a command enjoining a line of action which in the class of cases pointed to by it is in the long run best.

In stating this position I have ignored a multitude of controversies. It is affirmed for instance that one may go a step farther in defining 'the good-in-itself' than those who describe it as the satisfaction of desire have done; that what satisfies desire is pleasure; that pleasures are welcome, are held to be of value, are good, even when they come in a form