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246 fact, the author's metaphysical position is practically that represented by the "double aspect" theory. From the ethical standpoint, he pronounces in favor of "Meliorism," as opposed both to Optimism and Pessimism. The value of life is not to be found in its pleasures, but in work performed. That the aim of the book is distinctly ethical, is sufficiently indicated by the highly questionable statement (p. 5) that, "The best argument in favor of a philosophy is this, that people can live according to the maxims derived therefrom."

Philosophy seems to have a morbid fascination for the would-be author of the day. The above is one of several recent volumes in that department which have not the shadow of an excuse for being. Professedly upon an ultimate metaphysical question, it is in reality a curious mixture of bad metaphysics and even worse psychology. It is difficult to describe such a perplexed work in a few lines, but the book does not deserve more extended notice. As the author explains in the conclusion, it is the result of the righteous indignation with which he read certain articles on "Utility" in the English quarterlies a few years ago. The question arose, What, as a matter of fact, is the main-spring of all human action? Not, surely, "cold, rational designs of utility," but "sense desire." Causality and responsibility both presuppose intelligence, but intelligence is always present as a servant, and not as a master. Hence it must be subordinate, "an implication or endowment of sense." Moreover, sense must include all the vital elements of the self. Now intelligence, being a passive instrument, is pervertible. Its contradictions are referable to arbitrarily "free" acts of will in response to the solicitations of an "over-ruling sense." These propositions will, perhaps, sufficiently indicate the general drift of the book. Certain passages might seem to indicate that the author had misread Schopenhauer, but it is much more probable, on the whole, that he is quite innocent of any acquaintance with the standard literature of philosophy, except for a very superficial and inaccurate knowledge of Kant.

In Chapter I of this book, the author defines his problem and explains his method. The argument proceeds on the assumption that life is a good, and that its continuance is therefore desirable. The problem is: the grounds upon which immortality is predicted. The scientific, psychological, philosophical, and theological methods are mentioned. The method adopted is that of literature, which includes all the others. The method of literature, says the author, opens up the great field of history, and presents the great