Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/238

222 scientific results has cast upon the origin and growth of human morality.

It is, however, to the second division of the book that we turn with most interest, for in it is contained the author's original contribution to a theory of Evolutionary Ethics. The subject as a whole is not treated exhaustively; and at times the arguments are somewhat intricate, while the conclusion is not always so clearly set forth as might be desired. But such questions as are discussed are examined with thoroughness, and there is no slurring over of the difficulties involved. The criticism of the arguments in favor of a teleological conception of the universe is admirable, but the reasoning employed would perhaps justify a more definite rejection of such a conception than is here deduced. The summing up of the results of the investigation is thus given: "We have found in nature only variables, no constant and invariable factor, no independent one according to which the others vary; we have found no cause that was not also an effect; that is, we have discovered nothing but a chain of phenomena bearing constant relations to each other, no causes except in this sense" (p. 339). At the same time it is stated with regard to so-called transcendental causes that we have no proof of their existence, but likewise no proof of their non-existence. But if it be true that we find in the universe only causes and effects in the sense of what Hume calls the "constant conjunction" of phenomena, may we not say that the non existence of the transcendental cause is proved in the only way in which such proof is conceivable? If to find the sum of preexisting conditions is the sufficient explanation, and the only possible explanation, of any event, does not reason demand the elimination of any reference to extra-natural influences?

The chapter on Egoism and Altruism may be profitably compared with Mr. Spencer's treatment of the same subject in the Data of Ethics. The cautious and somewhat tentative derivation of altruistic from egoistic feeling is worth careful study. The examples cited of the apparent emergence of altruistic affections in the lower animals are very well chosen, and there is commendable moderation shown in the use that is made of them.

Evolutionary ethical systems are oftener optimistic than pessimistic, and the work under review is no exception to this rule. Society, we are assured, is, slowly indeed but surely, progressing toward a state of equilibrium which shall be "perfect though not absolute," that is, a state which, though it does not involve the absolute happiness of all individuals, yet implies the reduction of