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] that, though such things are, their being is but appearance. But, upon the other hand, in the Absolute, no appearance can be lost. Each one contributes and is essential to the unity of the whole. . . . Every element, however subordinate, is preserved in that relative whole in which its character is taken up and submerged. There are main aspects of the universe of which none can be resolved into the rest. . . . These factors, if not equal, are not subordinate the one to the other, and in relation to the Absolute they are all alike essential and necessary" (pp. 455-457).

In order to reach this result, it is necessary, in the first book, to consider the contradictions specifically involved in the conceptions of various well-known regions or aspects of the finite world, so long as these are supposed to represent reality. First, Qualities, primary and secondary, together with the "problem of inherence," are discussed in Chapters I and II. The outcome is that the "relation between the thing and its qualities is unintelligible." Similarly, in Chapter III, the result is that "relations with or without qualities are unintelligible." The inconsistencies of Space and Time occupy Chapter IV. "Motion and Change," "Causation," "Activity," "Things," form successively the topics of Chapters V-VIII. The "inconsistencies" and the "unintelligibility" involved in assuming these categories as representing reality instead of as embodying mere appearance, are here developed, generally in a very brilliant, but often, perhaps, in too concise, a fashion. Reminiscences of the Hegelian Phänomenologie and (at least in one or two passages) of the Herbartian negative criticism of the categories in question, are obvious in the text, although Mr. Bradley, for reasons explained in his Preface, has systematically omitted explicit special references to the easily recognizable and acknowledged historical relations of his discussion. Chapters IX and X, on the concept of the Self, are, in their negations, and despite their analogy to other views, more independent of the historical models; and here it is that our author's personal differences with current idealism first come into prominence. "Phenomenalism" and the "Things-in-Themselves" are disposed of very curtly in Chapters XI and XII; and the first book closes with the general "ruin" of the finite world with respect to its pretension to be a real world. The movement of the argument in this first book is alternately captivating (by reason both of its expert skill and of its fascinating relations to previous metaphysical discussion) and exasperating (by reason of its frequently whimsical treatment of opposing views). On the whole, one's fascination