Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/175

] eminently existent. Now, what possesses a quality in the highest degree in any genus is the cause of all the others under that genus. . . . Therefore there is something that is for all other entities the cause of their being, their goodness, and their every perfection, and this we call God."

This proof of God's existence, as made manifest by the gradations of perfection in creatures, has been an attractive one to many of the older philosophers. Let us, then, examine briefly into its meaning. "That is said to be perfect," writes St. Thomas, "in which there is nothing wanting proportioned to the measure of its perfection" (Sum. th., I, q. 4, a. 1). He further calls attention to the fact that "what has not been made, cannot properly be called perfect; but because of those things that are produced any one is said to be perfect when it is reduced from potentiality to act, the epithet perfect has been extended to signify what has actual being, whether such thing be or be not produced" (I, q. 4, a. 1). Although the perfections of creatures besides being manifested in varying degrees are so diverse in kind, yet the Angelic Doctor reduces them to three classes: "first, the essential constitution of an entity; secondly, certain superadded accidents necessary for its complete operation; thirdly, the end to which it naturally tends" (I, q. 6, a. 3). But again, all these may be grouped together as species of one genus, to which we apply the name of relative perfections; for that only is absolutely perfect which contains in itself all possible perfections after the most excellent manner. A further division of perfections classifies them as pure and mixed; the former involving in their concept no element of imperfection. Of pure perfections, being, substance, life, and intelligence are examples. Of mixed perfections, quantity and reason may be mentioned. It is with pure perfections only that this proof is concerned.

Our daily observations tend to deepen in us the conviction that the sensible objects about us are neither absolutely perfect nor contain any perfection in its highest degree. Reason further shows that it cannot be otherwise. For what is not absolutely perfect is in so far finite, and therefore dependent