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] of our thinking, but only its operation in an imaginary case, or in a limited sphere. What I want to indicate in my criticism is a method of adjusting its principles to the wants of current reasoning, and this can be done only by multiplying the rules for conditions not reckoned with in the ordinary canons of opposition, though the general principle is there recognized.

The difficulty comes from the attempt on the part of logicians to adjust the classification of propositions for the Figures and Moods of the syllogism to the laws of opposition, and thus simplify the problem, when in reality the two should not be thus articulated. The simple classification of judgments is that of the universal and particular for quantity, and the affirmative and negative for quality. All propositions which appear to be of another form are reduced to one or the other of these, and for the purposes of the syllogism this is unquestionably correct. But not so with the problem of opposition. Here we should distinguish the singular and the abstract, generic or general proposition from both the universal and particular, as well as recognize the distinction between distributive and collective propositions and the ambiguous indices of quantity in propositions. When this is done, we shall no doubt greatly complicate and multiply the rules for practice, but at the same time we shall have done something to harmonize formal logic with the needs of actual reasoning.

The accepted canons of Opposition make no provision for singular proposions. They are founded solely upon the conception of universals and particulars as defined for determining the Moods and Figures of the syllogism. They assume that singular propositions are reducible to universals, which is true in so far as the relation between subject and predicate is concerned, but is not true in respect of quantity. It is the latter fact, therefore, that forces us to modify the law of Opposition for them. A singular proposition can have no corresponding particular without totally changing the import of the word "some." To say "some Socrates was wise," as a supposed particular of "Socrates was wise" is merely to use the term "some" without any rational meaning at all, and to say "some