Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/138

122 seat of the soul. It was bad enough that an immaterial soul should have to be located somewhere in the body, but we are now required to find a place for a soul which is a corporeal atom with a definite shape and extent (cp. p. 201). Of course, no light is thrown on this problem, any more than on the question whence the vagrant atom enters the organism, or whither it departs at death. Instead of this, we are regaled with prolonged accounts of the vibrations of rhythmic atoms and of their ability to explain all the physical forces, in the course of which some statements are made calculated to disturb even the most philosophic tolerance of metaphysical physics. E.g., after reducing all matter to motions, and treating the latter as things in the naïvest manner, an objection strikes the authoress. "It is claimed that where there is motion something is moved. We answer, certainly. Power, energy is moved" (p. 52). After that, who shall gainsay the all-sufficiency of the rhythmic atom as the explainer of phenomena? It is, however, fair to say that the book is not everywhere quite of this type, and in the description of the relations of the central soul-atom to its subordinates it seems to be sometimes groping after a Leibnizian monadism.

To give an idea of its style and results, the following passage may be quoted: "The great practical Creative plan will work out its own final justification. Myriads of personal sensibilities, infinitely more countless than the sands of the seashore, having entered upon their heritage of immortality will go on to higher and higher realizations of its limitless possibilities. With assurances like these, catastrophies (sic) cease to be catastrophies (sic). The forces of Nature, which still work under the law of necessity, which, though it is included in the vast co-operative plan, is not yet re-coordinated for our especial benefit, can work us no lasting evil. If the Infinite who lives in all Duration is content to let all finite things act in accord with their own natures and opportunities, then shall our peace be unduly shaken?" In conclusion, one can only regret that this production should have been put forward as a contribution to philosophy rather than to science. For it really contains far more pseudo-science than pseudo-philosophy.

F. C. S. S.

Miss Shinn's paper contains a great deal of valuable psychological raw-material. It is such collections of fact as this, which, when methodically handled by a skilled psychologist, will form the basis of child-psychology. At present there is displayed, in general, too great a tendency to theorize upon an entirely insufficient foundation; we should, therefore, have bestowed upon the work our "thoughtful attention," even without Professor le Conte's injunction to do so. This growing habit of prefixing to a new book a