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The present volume is the sixth of the series of "Modern Philosophers." If one accept the idea of volumes of selections at all, a good deal is to be said for an attempt to present the philosophy of Hume in this form. It is by no means so plain as Dr. Aikin would have us believe that the stand-point of the Enquiry is essentially different from that of the Treatise, but the popular character of the former work makes it unsatisfactory for class use, while the first book of the Treatise is often found too long to be taken entire. Moreover, Hume's style is somewhat diffuse in the Treatise, which thus admits of considerable condensation. At the same time, the thread of the argument is by no means always easy to follow, and an epitome of the work is bound to be to a considerable extent, an interpretation.

The "Biographical Sketch" occupies only six pages, and consists mainly of quotations from Hume's own account of his life. The "Brief Exposition of Hume's Philosophy" occupies about eighteen pages. The first half of the exposition is taken up with a very compressed summary of the first book of the Treatise, while the rest is devoted to criticism. In each case a good deal has been attempted in a very little space, and the result can hardly be called satisfactory. Neither in the summary nor in the criticism is sufficient notice given to the fact that Hume merges the general question of causation in the particular question, "Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?" Moreover, Dr. Aikin's refutation of Hume's proof that logically reason should not be trusted is somewhat peculiar. "Granting that every judgment should be tested by another, and that each one would weaken the confidence reposed in that preceding it, it does not follow that all the original conviction would be finally destroyed; for in weakening the conviction attached to the second judgment, the third strengthens that belonging to the first: 1-(-}=, not, as Hume's argument supposes; and the sum of the series is two-thirds, not zero" (p. 47). Why not simply show, what is abundantly plain, that Hume's assumption of an indefinite regress here is gratuitous; that after the first judgment the question is, and remains, Is reason to be relied upon or not? and that the utter discrediting of reason by itself involves a logical absurdity. Other points might be mentioned, as, e.g., the inadequate treatment of Hume's conflicting statements regarding the origin of impressions; but space forbids further criticism.

The selections themselves seem to have been made with good judgment, but of course the only adequate test of such a volume is actual use in class