Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/129



This book covers the whole field of philosophy from its first beginnings among the Greeks to the present time. The proportions of the work are: Part I, Ancient Philosophy, pp. 12-90; Part II, Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 91-151 ; Part III, Modern Philosophy, pp. 152-518. From the preface, as well as from the title of the book, we might expect a treatment of the whole field of philosophy somewhat similar to that which Professor Royce has given us of one portion of it in the Spirit of Modern Philosophy. But the volume before us belongs to another generation, and is wholly different in spirit and method from that of Professor Royce. In spite of its title, the author appears to be almost destitute of historical appreciation. A remark which he makes incidentally,—"how much philosophy is wearisome, groping its way among inquiries which awaken thought but are beyond its grasp" (p. 173),—may well be taken as indicating Professor Bascom's attitude. For the book is chiefly occupied with the errors of philosophers, and the inconsistencies of philosophical systems. There is no attempt to place the systems criticised in their proper historical setting, or to estimate the part which the different ideas have played in the development of thought. Exposition is always subordinated to criticism, and there is a continual passage from one to the other that is very confusing. But worse, this mode of procedure oftentimes has resulted in giving an entirely false impression of the doctrines treated. 'Has the author,' we are tempted to ask, 'ever read through the systems he undertakes to criticise?' Besides this occasional unfairness or ignorance in exposition, Professor Bascom's criticism has defects both of form and temper which greatly detract from its force. Too often it consists in mere appeals to the language and modes of thought of ordinary life, in which rhetoric is made to do service for logic, and the 'philosophic temper' seems to be replaced by zeal in the defense of dogma.

In attempting to show grounds for these charges, I shall confine myself to that portion of the work which deals with Modern Philosophy. It is, perhaps, only fair to remark in passing that the treatment in Part I and Part II is much more objective, and therefore less open to criticism.

Professor Bascom lays down the principle that a sound philosophical temper "must express itself not so much in the severity of logical processes as . . . in a reluctance to do violence to the facts" (p. 205). . . . "When a logical development of premises is bringing one's convictions straight against familiar facts in human life, it is only ruthless iconoclasm, that, in