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352 a wide range of what may be assumed in different times and places to be ascertainable fact, from a reputation for character and intelligence or the diploma of a school to ecclesiastical ordination and the divine commission of a prophet, church or king; (3) Has it long enjoyed a wide recognition or is its recognition now increasing among men who consider their reliance upon it to have profited them? and (4) Is there traceable in its dictates hitherto an apparent trend of consistently developing purpose with which one has been in a general way in sympathy?

As to an impulsion and desire of one's own, one may consider, for example, (1) whether it is persistent and strong enough to render impossible any harmonious re-ordering of one's life in which it does not play some part; (2) whether it is genuinely what it purports to be and not quite another and unlike desire in disguise that does not venture to appear in its true character; (3) whether it is one which, if given recognition, will be likely to get beyond control and weaken one's capability for consecutive and purposeful action; and (4) whether it will be a means of developing new interests coordinate with itself and perhaps tending to restrain and differentiate it, or prove to be more probably an engrossing central interest about which all others that survive must be subserviently grouped. Finally, as regards an appeal for sympathetic interest, the following criteria are in point: (1) Is the need manifestly serious