Page:Philosophical Review Volume 27.djvu/549

No. 5] concept. Throughout the volume More lays a greater emphasis on the sceptical phases of the thought both of Socrates and Plato than is warranted by the Dialogues; I am not forgetful of his defence of the principle of negation (pp. 146 ff.). It is the affirmative and positive aspects of Socrates's thought that constitute his chief influence on subsequent Greek philosophy, and these are the only phases that Aristotle considers worthy of comment. The element of doubt or criticism is not so much a part of his doctrine as it is a phase of his methodology. The 'ignorance' of Socrates is the confession of an inquirer, not of a sceptic, and certainly not of an agnostic. The development of the mind and philosophy of Socrates, as I read Plato, exhibits the following essential aspects: (1) Criticism, the examination of the foundations of belief without the bias of dogmatic prepossessions. While the mental attitude here is that of doubt, it is not negation, which would logically cut short the search at the very outset. (2) Mysticism or intuition of the basic realities of morality and religion. With the mysticism of Socrates, as set forth in the Apology, the Crito, and throughout the lesser dialogues, there is joined in this affirmative-minded idealist the will to believe. (3) The transcendence of the relativity and scepticism of the Sophists by the universality of the concept and the establishment of the adequacy of reason as the sole guide of life. (4) The identification of the maxims and principles of reason with the bases of morality. As I understand the Dialogues and the history of the Socratic schools, Socrates was not only more of a rationalist than More pictures him, but he was less negative both in his thought and his influence.

The Platonic Quest, as characterized by More, is the "justification of spiritual insight before the bar of reason" and the determination of the relation between this knowledge and happiness. In this connection More finds occasion to analyze important portions of the Republic and to discuss, in a summary way, the various forms of government in their relations to ethics. The description of the Platonic aristocracy as "really a democracy governing itself by respect for what is best in human nature" (p. 71) is somewhat misleading, in view of the fact that the artisan and productive class is disfranchised in the Platonic state. Evidently More has in mind merely the democratic spirit and communism within the governing classes.

In the chapter on Plato's psychology the author illustrates his commentary by many references to the writings of modern theologians and philosophers. Particularly interesting is his comparison of the views of Jonathan Edwards on the will and its freedom with Plato's