Page:Philosophical Review Volume 27.djvu/270

258, namely, that actual existence is particular and cannot therefore be comprehended in a conceptual formula. The conceptual formulation of the facts, if pressed too far, necessarily gives rise to difficulties which do not admit of complete solution. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate to a considerable extent a method of viewing the facts which brings us as near as possible to a complete comprehension. In the first place, it is necessary to get rid of the time-bound view of experience. Just as in forming as adequate a conception as possible of the object of experience it is necessary to consider it as an indivisible whole in space and time, so also must the individual subject of experience be regarded as a unity in space and time. In other words, we must try to conceive some such world as the space-time universe of Minkowski. The latter applies his conception to the problems of physical science. In such a universe as he imagines, the entire existence of a physical system is specified by means of three space- and one time-coordinate, and is presented as a whole. In an exactly similar way we must look upon the individual subject as a space-time entity. His existence can only be specified as a whole; it is neither punctual nor instantaneous. From a logical standpoint, the proposition 'He exists' must not be supposed to imply any spatial nor temporal reference; that is, there is no real meaning in the notion of existence at a given point or at a given time, though we may adopt the idea conventionally. The point is brought out still more clearly if we consider non-existential propositions which may be asserted of the individual. In examining this point previously, we pointed out that one set of propositions might be true at one time, and another partly or wholly incompatible set at another time. If, however, the propositions are modified by the insertion of date and place, their truth is independent of space and time. The date and place referred to may be considered as uniquely determined. For example, if they be specified by position in conceptual space and time, they will yet be connected by a one-one correlation with the private space and time of each individual. The complete specification of an attribute of an individual, or of a relation of which he is one of the terms, must therefore contain a spatial