Page:Philosophical Review Volume 26.djvu/587

No. 5.] anthropomorphic. Another line of argument leads to the same conclusion. The scientific mood is only one of the many historical expressions of the full life of humanity, and as such it is conditioned by the same general factors that determine the other expressions. Particularly does it depend on racial and climatic conditions, which confine it to a definitely bounded geographical area and to a people of definite racial qualities, where and with whom alone it can attain its ends. It is, in short, the creation of the European west; one of the factors in the life of humanity, but not essentially inherent in the life of all people. If science is, therefore, so closely related to human life, what, more definitely, are the relations between the ends of science and the other ends which men pursue? All the aims of life may be classified conveniently into three,—truth, beauty, and goodness, each corresponding to and fulfilling, respectively, one of the factors in man's mental constitution,—intellect, feeling, and will. The claims of will, pursued exclusively, create morality and social institutions; those of feeling create art and literature; those of intellect, science and philosophy. But these three aims cannot remain separate except on paper, because it is the individual man who pursues in them the unity of his spiritual life, and only by the cultivation of them all does he attain his true spiritual stature. Yet all nations do not cultivate all these ends in like degree, the aims of morality being most universally pursued, while truth for truth's sake is most generally neglected, and this gives us a criterion by which to determine the value of different civilizations. Further, these three goods are internally related, mutually reciprocal; the cultivation of any one of them enriches the other two. Looking at one of them as the true end, as the all in all, either in theory or in practice, is indefensible, because the enrichment of human life in its entirety depends on the proportionate development of all three. Nor are all of these ends equally fundamental. Sociality, or the socialization of human life, is first in importance, but this is not based on practical action alone, but also on community of thought and feeling. It is false, on the one hand, to evaluate science on the basis of what it contributes to social life, and, on the other, to judge social life valuable merely in terms of scientific advance. Similarly, the supposed opposition between science and the humanities is one of the most grotesque of popular fallacies. Science is one of the humanities, one of the factors which enrich human life. The term 'humanities' should not be confined to Greek and Roman literature, nor even to literature alone; sculpture, music, and painting must be included, but above all must science, since man, in order to be himself, must be interested in the course of events outside, and in science he unites that outer course with his own inner rationality. Unless human interests turn to science, and unless science makes human life more intelligent, both have failed in their purpose.

Lotze held that while reality may be more extensive than our capacities for representing it, we are not interested in it beyond the range of intelligent