Page:Philosophical Review Volume 25.djvu/836

820 given object-matter its recognized name in the hearing of the others. A familiar name will, however, serve to call up similar notions in minds which do not commonly perceive the matter named, and, by the aid of synthetic and analytic treatment of contemplated object-matter, it is possible to extend this agreement to things which are too vast or too minute, too remote or too complex to be brought within direct range of the human sense-organs. It may even be extended to states and modes of consciousness which cannot be externally observed, but can be reflected upon as occurring in connection with the living and making self-organism, and, as psycho-physiology infers, in special connection with the nervous system and brain.

The simplest act of logical apprehension involves the presentation of two matters to the mind (1) some recognized term; (2) the notion, or passing idea, which is the immediate and subjective understanding of the term. Such an act of apprehension also implies a third matter, not immediately and subjectively presented, namely, (3) the object-matter, or matter consciously referred to—symbolized by the term and more or less adequately represented by the notion. This may also be called the thought-object.

In psychology it is necessary to consider ideas which form elements of perceptions, sentiments, or volitions, or appear as mental images, without the symbolic aid of words. In logic, on the other hand, we are spared any investigation of ideas, except as these constitute the meanings of terms. A truly significant term is an idea for logical purposes. One of these purposes,