Page:Philosophical Review Volume 25.djvu/159

No. 2.] Consider, then, a little further, the two statements, 'Good is that which is capable of satisfying desire,' and 'Good is that which calls forth my approval'; just what is there in the second statement not present in the first, that can be supposed to affect the meaning of 'good'? While, as I hold, nothing could justify its title to the name which did not satisfy desire, it does not seem to be the case that everything which satisfies desire is good. Apparently I may condemn an act even at the moment when I recognize that I am impelled to it by desire. And yet after all, so far as I can determine, approval adds nothing to the objective content of the thought. This still seems to be capable of being put adequately in terms of desire-satisfaction. Accordingly, the only alternative I see is this, that the additional ingredient in goodness is the peculiar tang or flavor which comes from the way in which satisfaction appeals to me, not when I feel it, but when I think it, and which must be located therefore in that 'pleasantness of the thought' which constitutes approval. I say that this is no new objective content, for the approval-pleasure does not exist as a quality of the object. And yet I feel that if I separate it altogether from my idea of goodness, something fundamental has been lost. When I envisage the full meaning of the word 'good,' I find myself demanding that it should have this feeling effect upon me. It is not enough to recognize intellectually the fact of satisfaction; the fact must somehow appeal to me favorably, when I recognize it, if it is to have value. And I refuse to admit that this denies objectivity to goodness, and identifies it with bare feeling. It is not, in the first place, mere approval, but the approval of something; and this something has an objective content which is open to testing. The mere fact that I approve it does not show therefore that it ought to be approved. The judgment that a thing is good, pre-supposes that it will satisfy desire, which rests not with my approval merely, but with the nature of things; so that I can ask intelligibly whether it is after all really good,—will actually have, that is, the effect which I suppose when I give it my approval. More particularly, does this possibility rest upon one special pre- supposition,—the existence of a certain determinate character to