Page:Philosophical Review Volume 25.djvu/156

144 It will be simpler if I propose a definition in particular, and then examine it in more detail with reference to the points which it aims to cover. Let us say, accordingly, that good is that which reveals a capacity, on reflection, for calling forth my approval; and that the only thing which I find common to the various objects of approval is the ability to give satisfaction, or pleasure. This is a double-jointed definition; and my point will be that the definition of goodness needs this twofold point of view if it is to correspond to what experience actually finds.

There are two senses in which you can ask about the meaning of good. The first has to do with the definite objective content of the thought, meaning by this the character of the thing which evokes the judgment. Certain things do, when I think of them, call forth my approval; that is my starting point. Such judgments are intuitive, in the sense that I cannot anticipate or force them, but have to wait to see what they turn out to be; and also in the sense that they are recognized as immediate judgments simply by looking into my own mind and finding them there. And when I set out to reflect upon and understand them, I seem to find that the reason why in all cases I call them good is that they give rise to satisfaction. It is to be noted that this is not a description of the nature of approval; it is the reason for approval. And for myself I can discover no other reason; nor can I conceive the possibility of my calling anything good except for this reason. In the last analysis, satisfying experience is the only sort of thing that arouses in me the judgment of approval; though it is not necessarily true that every form of satisfaction is thus approved, since there may be some counteracting cause.

It is also to be noticed that, as implied in the definition, good is a characteristic attributed to an object of thought, and not a mere feeling as an existent. An experience may be good, may have the quality, that is, which causes us to pronounce the judgment; but we have not sufficiently covered the case by simply 'feeling good.' When we are merely feeling pleasure, we are not in the state of mind which calls it good; that is a later experience. We must stand off and approve it, make it the object of an approving