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The position of Kant and the Neo-Kantians is identical in this, that both believe Nature to be determined through knowledge; through scientific synthesis. Neo-Kantianism in differentiation from Kant, holds that this determination occurs in the course of scientific procedure, rather than in an apriori way. Where Kant separated form from content, the Neo-Kantians recognize this separation only as a logical moment in knowledge. But knowledge is viewed in an external rather than immanental way, and the metaphysics of knowledge is set aside. In paying attention to knowledge on its external side alone, the strength of the older position is lost. The standpoint of immediacy is important. To the natural sciences personal observation and experiment are as essential as mathematics, while in biology and the historical sciences mathematical categories do not suffice. Ethics and Religion especially show that reality lies deeper than the Neo-Kantian method proposes to go. If epistemology is merely a discussion of scientific concepts as possible determinations of reality, it cannot deal adequately with these tendencies. The determination of reality by thought is impossible, if we conceive the determination as taking place through Kultur, rather than underlying it. The crisis of modern epistemology consists in this: that it conceives itself to be a philosophy of Kultur, while denying the metaphysical basis of Kultur. This is destructive of modern rationalism.

The fundamental philosophical question is, What must I do to attain the highest possible degree of freedom? Whether Idealism answers by a command to agree with the non-ego or to strive for the higher, the same fundamental practical principle is involved. From contact with other people (the first non-ego we meet) ensues the moral direction of the will. What gives it value? Utilitarianism answers, The pleasure resulting. Idealism says, Freedom-and this freedom is not foreign to the will but of its very essence. The Utilitarian theory is not satisfactory as a standard of ethics. But, is a standard requisite? Not until I am conscious that a higher degree of freedom belongs to the moral will than to the immoral, does the sense of duty become more than a subjective taste. Moreover, without the consciousness that the moral will is founded in the very nature of being, there is no assurance for a continuance of morality, either in the world or in any particular individual.

There are two extremes of opinion as to whether the struggle for existence is a necessary concomitant of human life. One holds that it is a natural law