Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/580

564 the second place its potentialities for future happiness or pain for self or others " (p. 143). Again, "In themselves all kinds of experience that are equally pleasant are equally worthy; there is no meaning to that adjective as applied to intrinsic immediate good" (p. 144). The author has a faith that the "consonance of this sketchy account of the basis of morality with Christianity and all idealism can be demonstrated" (p. 82).

The self evidence of the hedonistic point of view and the absurdity of any other position evidently appears to the author as beyond question. For of the 455 pages of the book only fifteen (pp. 148-163) are devoted to alternative theories. This is probably due to the author's scepticism with regard to ethical theory, since "our judgments are narrow and misrepresent actual values" (p. 82). Six pages are devoted to a refutation of Kant, although "as a theorist he is hopelessly inadequate" (p. 101). Self-development or self-realization "gives us no criterion" (p. 150), is "essentially pagan," and "inferior to the Christian ideal of service" (p. 159), and, "if taken strictly, is immoral" (p. 160).

Perhaps it is true that the author's psychologism carries him farther than he is aware; for although, in the matter of self-control "modern psychology ... shows us clearly and exactly how to succeed" (p. 277), and as "all our moral education is, in psychological language, but so much 'suggestion," "we must practice auto-suggestion" (p. 279). In order to make the magic quite conclusive, "One can often convince ones self quite thoroughly of ideas one did not really believe in by this method of suggestion" (p. 281). This is Morality! But alas, "'Mere morality' ... is not enough ... we need more than morality, as the word is commonly used" (p. 288). "We must pretend to be happy" (p. 299); and "it will pay to pretend hard; when we have pretended long enough, we shall find we no longer need to pretend" (p. 300).

That this sort of thing should appear as the theoretical basis of a modern attempt at a treatise on ethics (and such this book pretends to be as is indicated by the subtitle) will seem surprising to those who have any knowledge of the history of ethical thought. Hence I prefer to let the above quotations go without further comment. Part III on Personal Morality and Part IV on Public Morality are discussions of present-day social questions, and in some cases would be quite worth while were the discussion guided by any well-defined principle. As to the book as a whole I fail to see any field in which it might be useful. The historical and the theoretical parts are negligible. The practical problems discussed are better treated in many recent books on economics and social theory. The style is entertaining, but there are many outbursts of eloquence on the sweetness and joy of living where one has a right to expect some sound analysis of the facts of life.