Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/50

34 adequate. If the time-process is real, such atonement for the earlier by the later—for the less adequate representations by the more adequate—is conceivable; but if it is unreal, the atonement is not conceivable.

We have now considered the various ways known to us in which one might try to reconcile man's belief in the compensating power of the later stages of life with the doctrine of the unreality of change, and we have shown that each of these attempts must end in failure. We cannot as a result of our survey assert out-right that the doctrine and the belief are incompatible; for perhaps one might attempt a reconciliation in some other way that has not occurred to us. But I think that we are justified in saying that so far as we can at present see, man's belief in the supreme importance of the later stages can be defended only if we conceive the temporal character of human life in the way that we have suggested. As the matter stands at present, we must either adopt this conception or condemn as utterly mistaken our belief in the transforming power of the later stages. Now there can be little question that we feel it to be of vital importance that the fuller realizations of value shall appear in the later stages of a man's history. So long as a life falls short of complete attainment, we demand that at least it shall show