Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/47

No. 1.] which A is the smallest and N the largest. Now according to our opponent, man's belief that if n be good its character atones for that of a, which we will suppose to be evil, can be justified without our assuming the reality of change. If the whole, N,—represented to us in n, the final stage,—is good, it compensates for the fact that a certain part A,—represented to us by a, one of the early stages—is evil. The excellence of the whole atones for the evil of some of the parts. But it is precisely at this point that we must raise an objection. It is only if change be real that the excellence of the whole can atone in the slightest degree for the evil of the part. If change is real it is possible, we have urged, that the part one of the earlier stages may be transmuted in the whole, the final stage. But if change is unreal, how can this be? If A becomes N, it is conceivable that N might atone for A. But if change is unreal, ''A, B, C, ... N'' are all equally existent, equally eternal. Now N, which by hypothesis is good, includes A, which is evil; but A does not in its turn include N. Hence for A there is eternally nothing but A. That is, there is no escape from misery or sin: a 'temporary* suffering or sin is really eternal. And if it be eternal its evil is not transmuted.

But, one may here interpose, does not our own experience present many cases in which the excellence of the whole cancels the evil of the part, and vice versa the evil of the whole the excellence of the part? In many a noble deed there is some slight admixture of unworthy motive; in many a glorious achievement of art there is some minor defect in conception or execution; and it is a commonplace of experience that

"Our sincerest laughter With some pain is fraught."

Yet each of these wholes is 'good,' and its excellence seems to atone for the deficiency of some of its parts.