Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/249

No. 2.], but in reasoning it is the reconstituting of a whole in experience from given parts. That this is inevitable, our intercourse shows. It is only as we concur in our belief in an external world which can be known through the fragments of sense, that causation as a concept is possible.

The right way to ascertain what is the true philosophical problem is to ask, What do men want, that they philosophize? The needs of men may be grouped under the heads of Knowledge and Practical Well-being. Knowledge, being more inclusive, is the higher good of the two. The field of intellectual pursuits may be subdivided into the special branches of science, on one hand, and the all-inclusive philosophy, on the other. Philosophy represents the consummation of a progress in which each science is a stage. Such a knowledge, gratifying most fully the contemplative instinct, must also tend to promote the gratification of the other great instinct, that for practical welfare. This being the true philosophical problem, modern philosophy has fallen short of it, because the present systems have set aside that inclusiveness to which the superlative worth of philosophy is due. This failure may happen in either of two ways. First, a principle might be discovered to hold of the universe as a whole, which by its very nature could not, in any time, place, or circumstance, be turned to practical account. Secondly, a principle might be discovered which could not help to account for the specific character of any particular fact known to science. The kind of principle which excludes the satisfaction of other than contemplative needs cannot rightly be termed a philosophical principle. Nor can we call a principle genuinely philosophical, which cannot account for the specific character of things; for the superior value of philosophy over science lies in that it is broader than science, but it is not broader if it leaves out what the sciences contain. The 'schools' of present-day philosophy, it is contended, do for the most part announce just such intellectually and practically barren principles as described above. Not all their doctrines are such, of course; but the ones that are noticed, fought over, defended, and attacked most ardently, are in the main quite sterile. (Here follow the author's indictments against the various schools.) It is as if one, consumed by thirst, were offered an empty goblet, elaborately carved and of exquisite workmanship. He may, if his thirst permit, contemplate the goblet, and argue with friends over its proper description; as the dispute waxes hotter, he may even forget his thirst. This way has modern philosophy gone. The human race has need of a knowledge which philosophy alone is capable of giving but which it has not even attempted to furnish. {{hi|Class Distinctions. {{sc|H. O. Meredith}}. The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXV, 1, pp. 33-53.]] Class distinction is indicated by the aversion to intimate relations—Especially the relation of marriage—caused not so much by differences of wealth as {{smallrefs}}