Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/122

106 for the rights of the neighbor; but it is not from love of one's neighbor that one ought to respect his rights, but from love of oneself.

It is to one's interest to behave oneself; immorality is, after all, a mistake, a miscalculation of interests. "There is no real antagonism between buyers and sellers. ... Every time a laborer uses violence to obtain a higher wage than the natural market-price, he robs himself. ... The interest of the employer and that of the laborer are identical." Similarly, the idea that we can enrich ourselves more quickly by robbery than by work is false; the fact is, we enrich ourselves in the quickest way by scrupulously respecting the rights of the neighbor. "Evil does not come from each one's pursuing his own interest (life would be impossible without that); properly speaking, evil comes from one's not pursuing one's interest." When we violate the moral rules we are acting contrary to our interests; we are simply foolish, ignorant, incapable of seeing things from any but a narrow, personal point of view.

The same remarks apply to international morality. Bismarck did wrong in annexing Alsace-Lorraine,—not because he failed to consider the happiness of France (altruism), but because he did not consider the happiness of Ger- many (egoism). If Bismarck had seen clearly, he would have understood that greater harm would come to Germany from the effect of his action on the French people than good to Germany from the annexation of French territory. Olliver called Bismarck un barbare de genie. He was a barbarian, according to M. Novicow, because he acted harshly, because he had no regard for any one's rights and considered only his narrow and personal point of view. But he was not a genius,—barbarian and genius are contradictory terms, for the simple reason that he acted immorally, that is, contrary to the interests of his own people. Genius is the capacity to see the most distant horizons and to attain the highest conceptions of the human spirit. When in 1890, after the failure of Baring Brothers, the Bank of France came to the assistance of the Bank of England,—at a time when France and England were not on good terms,—it was because the governors of the Bank of France com- prehended the real interests of their institution. The sole difference between the governors of the Bank of France and the German government is that the former understood their true interest while the latter did not. When the political leaders of Europe understand their own interests as clearly as the financiers understand theirs, the European federation will become a fait accompli.

M. Novicow's attempt to rehabilitate the old philosophy of enlightened self-interest is characterized by clearness, simplicity, and directness, and there is nothing in the practical teachings of the book with which the most humanitarian moralist of our times will find fault. Unfortunately, however, the argument on which they are based is fallacious: enlightened self-interest, as M. Novicow conceives it, does not justify our traditional morality. It is true that if there were no such thing as theft, there would be no chains, no strong boxes, no fortresses, no breast-plates, no policemen, no lawyers, no judges, no soldiers, no marines, and so forth; and if all men were liars and