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215 in the character of the agent and within the range of his possible attainment. ... In order to awaken enthusiasm and inspire effort the ideal must be raised far above the actual and represent a height of attainment which appears impossible enough to all save the enraptured idealist" (p. 35).

In Part II, on "The Nature of the Good," are shown the claims of Hedonism and Rationalism as one-sided and opposing schemes. There is perhaps nothing in the book more admirably done than the discussion of volition as an organizing agency (Chapter IV). Volition is the self in action, exercising its intellectual and emotional resources in realizing its ideals of good. It is "the synthetic activity which includes within its scope all these lesser activities of feeling, thought and action" (p. 135). Volition is creative of self-conscious personality, is in fact the self in the process of self-realization. It must advance on its own initiative to grapple with an uncertain future. The thread-bare question of freedom is judiciously handled. Extremes are avoided. Freedom in the sense of self-direction is allowed. The author rightly sets aside as absurd the device of those who in their zeal for freedom contend that the will may follow the weaker motive. "The explanation of freedom is self-determination, the explanation of self-determination is development—the realization of the latent and often unknown possibilities of human nature" (p. 167). Full Self-realization, or the complete organization of human conduct, requires the realization of (1) the Individual Self, (2) the Social Self, (3) the Universal Self. The third and culminating phase concerns the adjustment of human interests to the All-encompassing Reality. This, though a question of religion rather than of Ethics, is an essential aspect of self-realization. It involves not so much specific activities in addition to those prescribed by individual and social duty as "a personal attitude—resignation to" (better, accord with) "the divine will, and trust in the divine wisdom." That the principle of Self-realization furnishes an adequate criterion for the moral life is argued at length and, as it seems, convincingly in Part III, "The Good as Self-realization." After an introductory consideration of Hebraism and Hellenism and their synthesis in the Christian ideal, the author takes up the criticisms of Professor Sorley and Professor Boodin. In reply to Professor Sorley's assertion that Self-realization "is void of moral content and cannot express the nature of the moral ideal," he points out that "according to Self-realization, the Good lies in the realization of the whole self in distinction from any part or division of the self. From this ideal we secure a clear and decisive