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The avowed purpose of this book is to bring together 'the results of recent work in biology in general and in zoology and neurology in particular, and in anthropology, and to show the significance of this work for the analysis of human behavior.'

The early chapters, the first half of the book, in fact, deal with purely biological matters, the nature of living matter, the cell, the theories of heredity and evolution as they have been formulated by Lamarck, Darwin, Mendel, De Vries, and Galton. Next a series of chapters is devoted to the behavior of unicellular organisms as discussed by Verworn, Loeb, and Jennings. The various tropisms are described and an account is given of the more important theories of the activities of these low forms. The author expresses little sympathy for the conclusion of Jennings that even in these lowest organisms one may find many of the characteristics of the behavior of higher organisms.

Three chapters are devoted to a description of the nervous system and its development. The work of Sherrington, Herrick, and Johnston is summarized with some completeness. Numerous long quotations, insure an accurate statement of the views of these men. It might be questioned whether the various views are sufficiently fully introduced and knit together and freed from technical terms to make them comprehensible to the uninitiated for whom alone the book has value,—a question that can only be answered through trial. If it prove available in these respects it will be very convenient to have the material in one volume.

What is perhaps the characteristic personal contribution of the author in the volume as a whole first makes its appearance in the chapters on instinct. This is a questioning of the conclusions of much of the current discussion of instinct. After collating most of the more modern definitions of instinct he eliminates one by one many activities that are somewhat loosely brought together under the term. He has the usual difficulty in distinguishing between reflex on the one hand and the results of intelligent action as crystallized in habit on the other. What he objects to most is the usual custom of using the term