Page:Philosophical Review Volume 22.djvu/83

No. 1] distinction between action and movement;" but it does not follow, that the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary actions is unimportant in a study which undertakes to discuss the 'nature' of conduct in all its 'varieties and kinds.' If, however, the Will "means first the state of mind that we call volition or willing, and secondly, the nervous activity underlying that state of mind;" and if "it is the nervous activity, and not the state of mind, that produces the bodily movement;" not only is the ordinary distinction abolished between those modes of action upon which ethical judgments are passed and those upon which they are not passed, but the distinction between movement and action is made to depend solely upon external characteristics and not upon any internal differences.

"An act always serves an end: a movement need serve no end." The author admits, however, that while it is desirable, it is not always possible to eliminate all reference to mental states and processes, and in spite of "the fathomless abyss that separates mind from matter," throughout the greater part of the present volume he employs the familiar language of psychology and common sense and speaks as though mental states were not merely the accompaniments but the causes of Conduct. Thus, "Conduct is action in pursuit of Ends, and is composed of Acts undertaken to attain Ends." The true distinction between action and movement is that the former is always purposive, while the latter is not. "By an end is meant a purpose. The End is the purpose served by the Act." The words 'End' and 'purpose' however are both ambiguous, and I am not sure just what the author means by a 'purposive' act. An act 'done with a purpose' is not precisely the same thing as an act that 'serves a purpose,' though the author uses the two phrases interchangeably; and many so-called actions such as sneezing, coughing, vomiting, parturition, are purposive in the latter sense, though they need not be, and usually are not voluntarily performed in order to attain a represented end. But whatever we take 'purposive' to mean, the author holds that the study of Conduct resolves itself into the study of Action and the study of Ends or Purposes: and Book I accordingly considers modes of Action, while Book II examines the ends that conduct strives to attain, and the means by which these ends are compassed.

The origin of conduct is to be found neither in reflex action nor in volition (pp. 6, 7). From the biological point of view conduct is the product of two factors, the internal and the external. For the "internal factor" read 'the nervous system with its accumulation of motion,' and for the "external factor" read 'environment.' Given the store of motion within the organism, and the response of the organism to the