Page:Philosophical Review Volume 22.djvu/421

No. 4.] sentiment to a type of conduct regarded with social approval; but in the one case this connotes the overcoming of fear by free expression of pugnacity, and in the other, restraint of sex. A woman's misconduct reflects upon her husband's honor because it seems to imply in him lack of courage in pugnaciously maintaining his rights. Male chastity had an altogether different origin, and comes under the head of temperance.

The foregoing analysis of our two oldest and psychologically simplest virtues is perhaps sufficient to suggest, though not to do justice to the method of attack rendered possible by the psychology of instinct and sentiment. It is claimed that this method, by indicating the psychological origin and present foundation of the virtues, throws light upon the manner and degree in which they can rightfully be regarded as objective. Space permits only very brief reference to the five other virtues of prime ethical importance.

The virtue of Temperance has always signified control of the strong appetitive instincts in obedience to the demands of ultimate social and individual welfare. The food-seeking instinct has become almost completely brought under control through the conventionalized social meal and the ritual of table etiquette. Present sentiment in regard both to male chastity and moderation in the use of alcohol well illustrates the various means available for the suppression, restraint, control, sublimation, and conventionalized expression of instincts whose excessive strength in many individuals constitutes a menace to civilized society.

Justice, psychologically considered, is the conscious recognition of moral indignation as the proper mental attitude to wrong-doers, and implies the rational balancing of anger and tender emotion. Wisdom is a rational expression of the instinct of curiosity or wonder. This instinct comprises, among its forms, reverie, the impulse to intellectual speculation, and the apparent desire for knowledge for its own sake. The coöperation of this instinct in the form of a virtue often effects an intelligent co-ordination