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[ABBREVIATIONS.—''Am. J. Ps.=The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.=Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.=Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.=Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.=The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.=International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.=The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.=Journal de Psychologie; Psych.Bul.=Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.=Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.=Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.=Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.=Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.=Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.=Rivista di Filosofia e Sciense Affini; V. f. w. Ph.=Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.=Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.=Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.''—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Philosophical discussion has lately had reference to idealism, opponents of which are divided into the two main camps of pragmatism and realism. An article by Professor McGilvary is made the basis of a distinction between the latter views. The question involved is that as to how the same fact may be at the same time a member of the 'objective' and of the 'subjective' order. The relation of consciousness to the object Professor McGilvary explains by means of the concept of 'centrality.' This relation is selective, and under its influence the object changes. So far as it goes, the pragmatist can agree with this view, but with reference to constructive theory, it serves only as a mode of approach. The conclusions for realism obtained in this way are obtained by ignoring the very facts which set the problem. This view leads to representationism. On the other hand, from our 'internal' point of view, fixity is but relative and things experienced possess a boundless mobility, they are different things by being experienced. But attention is called not primarily to the cogency of this view so much as to a recognition of the character of the problem.

I. Until very lately intelligence has been considered as a purely subjective concept and instinct as a purely objective concept. The two should not be contrasted but rather correlated in terms of feelings and actions. II. It appears, from the objective point of view, that the whole gamut of animal activities is explicable on the basis of a unity of biological process; that no line of distinction can be drawn between the process evidenced in hesitant,