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704 the reviewer's opinion, is emphatically not the most important side. Hume is supposed to represent "Sympathetic Naturalism." As might be expected, the exposition of his system is hardly illuminating; and the summary condemnation of Hume involves the unconditional rejection of all forms of 'naturalism,' as will be seen from the following quotation. "Naturalistic methods tend either to degenerate into Exclusive Egoism, or to regard conscience as an unreasonable and inexplicable instinct. Hume's Ethics illustrates the first [sic] of these defects, and to some extent the second, since he can give no reason why some natural virtues are approved. ... Moral obligation, as ordinarily understood, is therefore meaningless in Hume's system; we cannot be under an obligation to do anything except to follow the pleasure of the moment, and we must do that" (pp. 188, 189). Such passages are painfully reminiscent of some of the most unfortunate pages ever penned by Green, and show only too clearly that the author of this volume, in spite of his ability and evident sincerity, lacks the capacity for really understanding positions fundamentally different from his own.

Considering his attitude toward 'naturalism' in general, it was perhaps to be expected that Mr. Rogers would have little to say of Utilitarianism in its unadulterated form, which for him dates from Bentham. He devotes less than six pages of actual exposition to Bentham and J. S. Mill, representing "Egoistic Utilitarianism" and "Sympathetic Utilitarianism" respectively, while he gives more than seven pages of exposition to Sidgwick, as representing "Intuitional Utilitarianism." The chapter on "Evolutional Naturalism" is almost wholly devoted to a rather conventional exposition and criticism of Spencer. The final chapter, "English Rational Idealism," gives a very brief account of T. H. Green's ethical theory, which, however, is fairly intelligible in the light of the previous treatment of the ethical philosophy of Kant and Hegel in the two chapters following that on Hume.

This volume of Essays represents, as the editor's preface states, "an attempt to carry out a plan which William James is known to have formed several years before his death." The twelve essays of which the book consists were originally published as separate articles by Professor James. In preparing this volume, the editor "has been governed by two motives. On the one hand he has sought to preserve and make accessible certain important articles not to be found in Professor James's other books. ... On the other hand he has sought to bring together in one volume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent, coherent and fundamental doctrine" (p. v). The doctrine in question is that to which the author gave the name of radical empiricism, which, though intimately connected, was not by him identified with pragmatism. In order to carry out the plan as Professor James seems