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[.—''Am. J. Ps.=The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.=Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.=Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.=Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.=The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.=International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.=The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.=Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.=Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.=Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.=Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.=Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.=Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.=Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.=Rivista di Filosofia e Sciense Affini; V. f. w. Ph.=Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.=Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.=Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.''—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Up to the time of the Rennaissance, the question of this relation did not exist, as there was no autonomous science; at that time, however, science and philosophy became coördinate mental disciplines. Next, Descartes's theory of the "point of view" destroyed this relation, and science now left no place for philosophy except as a coördinate science or as the knowledge of immediate experience. When philosophy tried to be a distinct science it split up into several sciences, psychology, æsthetics, ethics. On the other hand, when philosophy tried to deal with immediate experience, it discovered that it ceased to be knowledge, for by mere unmediated intuition nothing can be known. So philosophy as the unity of human experience disappears. Now the human mind seems to be provided with two organs of knowledge; the scientific categories and the reason, so in working from science to justify philosophy, we need not predetermine the result by using solely the scientific ideal of knowledge. On the contrary, science itself requires the use of the reason as it needs a basis of assumptions for its work. Even in mathematics this is true, for here we have to assume the infinite. In life and action too, we have certain postulates which turn out to be the same as those of science; the idea of infinite possibilities of action, of changes qualitative and quantitative, of adaption, combination and duty. So it is possible to see in reason the common root of life and science, which can only be separated by an artificial distinction. Thus philosophy reinstates itself with a method, combined of dialectic and intuition, and a function of seeking the connections of life and science in three ways: (1) Analysis of scientific method, (2) the showing of the relations between reality and the fields of art, morality, and religion, (3) the study of truth and existence. This, however, leaves it difficult to state