Page:Philosophical Review Volume 21.djvu/130

112 to be one of complexity merely. "In insects, despite the multiplicity of sensations, associations between sensations remain comparatively few and simple. On the other hand, the cerebral cortex of the higher vertebrates allows of the formation of numerous and complex associations, often composed of elements which are not themselves simple. ... Intelligence results from the interactions among these associations." In the third part of the book there are brief discussions of the various experimental methods for investigating the intelligence of vertebrates, the largest amount of space being devoted to the method of PawlowPaslov [sic], which is based on the power of stimuli associated with food to evoke a flow of saliva.

In this book, as in his earlier writings, Bohn is guilty of the inconsistency which is characteristic of his school: he uses terms that have always carried a subjective implication, such as sensation, association, and psychism, while insisting that he means by them merely certain objective facts of behavior. If one holds to the view, quite erroneous in the reviewer's opinion, that we can know nothing about the inner aspect of behavior in animals, one should use in describing this behavior words that do not suggest the existence of such knowledge.

This book was originally published anonymously in 1891; and a second edition was published under the author's name in 1894. Since the latter date the author has been engaged in defending and propagating his "humanistic" version of pragmatism. The speculative metaphysics of the Riddles, has thus stood outside the main current of his thought, and is now re-published with some misgivings. "The discovery in philosophic method, which is generally called Pragmatism, but more truly and significantly Humanism, has rendered more or less out of date every earlier work in metaphysics." Hence the author is "bound to confess that if he were now free to handle the whole subject afresh, the result would not be identical with the contents of this book" (Preface, pp. v, x). A sentence in the original edition to the effect that "a philosophical system ... will be ratified by the way it works and stands the test of experience," nevertheless "sufficiently attests the continuity of his original views with his present Humanism" (p. 169).

The principal changes in the present edition are as follows: (1) the addition of occasional notes bringing the illustrations of scientific procedure up to date; (2) the addition to Chapter III, on Scepticism, of two new sections, dealing with current theories of truth; (3) the revision of Chapter V, on "Reconstruction," to harmonize with the Humanist theory; the addition, as an appendix, of a discussion of "Free Will and Necessity"; the re-printing as appendices of an article on "Choice," and an address on "Science and Religion"; the addition of an index; the alteration of the sub-title, from "A