Page:Philosophical Review Volume 20.djvu/452

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M. Aslanian in this work undertakes the heroic task of presenting a complete account of human evolution in society 'from an entirely new point of view.' "Je crois avoir trouvé la solution du problème de l'évolution de l'humanité," he declares. Unfortunately it is difficult to agree with the author on this point, or indeed to find in his work any solution whatever of the greater questions of social evolution. The book falls into two parts, an analysis and a synthesis. In the former M. Aslanian sets out to define and explain such terms as 'progress,' 'instinct,' 'imitativity,' 'homogeneity,' 'solidarity,' etc. As M. Aslanian often employs terms in rather unusual senses, the necessity for definition is evident. Briefly put, the argument is as follows. All social progress depends on 'solidarity' within social groups, solidarity being defined as "un sentiment de mutualité se déterminant librement, excluant toute limitation de responsabilité toute prescription, et formant des groupes d'un caractère permanent" (p. 70). M. Aslanian refuses to admit any essential differentiation between the various races except in respect of solidarity. Yet solidarity in its turn depends on 'homogeneity.' One would have thought that social progress involved heterogeneity—some form of differentiation—no less than homogeneity, but the author makes the sweeping statement, "A mesure que la similitude des individus par rapport à leurs aptitudes et leurs besoins diminue, la solidarité libre et spontanée fait place à la contrainte ou à la désagrégation" (p. 94). We are next told to distinguish 'solidarity' from 'social bonds' (liens sociaux), which are definite ways in which the former expresses itself. These, according to the author, are two in number. "Ainsi la religion et l'idée de race sont-elles les seules caractéristiques de l'integration des groupes" (p. 107). Such a limitation, like many others in M. Aslanian's theory, seems extremely arbitary. Are not customs, manners, language, affection for certain ideas, for a certain territory, etc., equally expressions of social unity?

The 'social bonds,' the author proceeds to point out, have a subjective character. What is implied is the idea of religious or racial superiority, and all integration of groups depends on such a sentiment of superiority. Accordingly, there are two types of community, based respectively on the principles of 'theism' and 'nationalism.’ All such integration gives individuality to the group so integrated, and this individuality reveals itself as a standard or mode of living (train de vie). With a discussion of the train de vie the author concludes his analysis of social factors.