Page:Philosophical Review Volume 20.djvu/438

424 this to be true. Then we cannot say that, apart from dates, A has to B either the relation of loving or that of hating. ... 'A loved B in May' is a relation, not between A and B simply, but between A and B and May" (p. 179). "The theory of judgment which I am advocating is, that judgment is not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the Various other, terms with which the judgment is concerned. ... We may therefore state the difference between truth and falsehood as follows: Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is true when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false. Thus in the above illustration, love, which is a relation, is one of the objects of the judgment, and the judgment is true if love relates A and B. The above statement requires certain additions which will be made later; for the present, it is to be taken as a first approximation" (pp. 180-1). One of these additions consists in ruling perceptions out from this definition on the ground that 'perception, as opposed to judgment, is never in error' (p. 181). The second addition introduces the distinction of the different 'senses' of a relation, and with this addition we are ready to understand the "exact account of the 'correspondence' which constitutes truth. Let us take the judgment 'A loves B.' This consists of a relation of the person judging to A and love and B, i.e., to the two terms A and B and the relation 'love.' But the judgment is not the same as the judgment 'B loves A'; thus the relation must not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A. The corresponding complex object which is required to make our judgment true consists of A related to B by the relation which was before us in our judgment. We may distinguish two 'senses' of a relation according as it goes from A to B or from B to A. Then the relation as it enters into the judgment must have a 'sense,' and in the corresponding complex it must have the same 'sense.' Thus the judgment that two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate sense: the 'corresponding' complex consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same sense. The judgment is true when there is such a complex, and false when there is not. The same account, mutatis mutandis, will apply to any other judgment. This gives the definition of truth and falsehood" (pp. 183-4).

In comment I must confine myself to the statement of one difficulty that meets me in my attempt to accept this view. Mr. Russell agrees