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58 In fact, his vacillating adherence to the dogmatic ontology of the age is in marked contrast with the clearly developed Kantian refutation of the Wolffian method. Probably, however, had Lambert been aware of the logical conclusion of Locke's sensationalistic epistemology in Berkeleyan Idealism, he would have avoided, as did Kant, such a contradiction. And had he read Hume, his main argument for the absolute objectivity of the physical world, that there must be a cause of sensation, would have vanished. But it is a matter for discussion whether Kant himself, in spite of his study of Hume, may not be criticised as regards his views on causality and its application to the Ding-an-sich.

Remarking now briefly upon Lambert's thought as a unity, there is, we think, a fundamental fallacy in the Organon. I refer to its eclecticism. Lambert sought to unite the philosophies of Leibniz and Locke. But the main problem was one of method, and the two methods, empiricism and rationalism, were diametrically antithetical. The Kantian Criticism did not seek to unite the two methods, but rather to construct a new method to take the place of its predecessors. Lambert perceived clearly the need of a new method in philosophy, but this he failed to give. The Organon is rich in scientific method, but formulates no laws of philosophical method. Nevertheless, the general trend of thought in the Organon, not to speak of many important doctrines, is in reality that of the Critique of Pure Reason.

As to the possible influence exerted by Lambert upon the Königsberg philosopher, this might have taken place in one of two ways, — either through the published works of Lambert, or through his letters to Kant. Discussing first the relation of Lambert's publications to the thought of Kant, the Theory of the Heavens was written independently of Lambert's astronomical speculations, as it was composed before the Cosmological Letters was published. With regard to the Organon, it is doubtful whether Kant was influenced by any of the views here expressed, unless it was by those bearing on the a priori basis