Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/70

56 order that these concepts be brought to consciousness (§656). Furthermore, the a priori sciences of geometry and kinetics prove the a priori nature of the concepts that make them possible (§658). Such being the process of knowledge, what relation does knowledge have to being? In answer to this, Lambert argues that idealism cannot explain the distinction we make between the true and the apparent, a position clearly that of the scientist rather than the metaphysician. But the senses by which we perceive the objective world, Lambert continues, are limited in their ability to respond to external stimuli. We have no means of perceiving electric phenomena directly, nor yet the ether waves beyond the red and the violet ends of the spectrum. The objective phenomena, furthermore, which we perceive are homogeneous, since they are all modes of motion; but the subjective corresponding phenomena are heterogeneous sensations. Hence, from the very nature of knowledge, involving, as it does, a subjective factor, a philosophy of pure realism is impossible. But an objective factor, also, is necessary in cognition. By developing, therefore, our scientific knowledge from empirical and consequently objective data, we may in our thought approach nearer and nearer to the ultimate reality that underlies the apparent. But this ultimate reality we can never reach, by reason of the partial subjectivity of knowledge, and the world as known, therefore, will ever be but a symbol of that which is.

From this brief exposition of the Lambertian philosophy, we cannot but conclude that the author was endeavoring to solve the one philosophic problem of the age, and effect a reconciliation of the empirical and rational theories of knowledge. Lambert was, therefore, on Kantian ground, and it is necessary to point out more clearly the exact relation that exists between the two systems of thought.

Noticing briefly the points of contact in the early astronomical speculations of Lambert and Kant, before proceeding to a comparison of their respective theories of knowledge, we