Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/69

Rh gravitation as well. Lambert, furthermore, argues from the successes of the empirical method in physical science, that all our knowledge is based on experience, but that the greater our knowledge of the physical universe, the greater appears to be our ignorance of its true constitution. He holds, however, that Leibnizian Teleology is quite in harmony with a mechanical theory of the universe, such as experience shows to exist. From this it is evident that Lambert is realistic in his sympathies, and that he endeavors to reconcile empiricism with rational metaphysics.

In the Cosmological Letters, as we have seen, Lambert is led up to ontological problems from the inductively ascertained laws of physics and astronomy. In the New Organon on the other hand, which is a treatise on logic and scientific method, we are introduced to the problems of the theory of knowledge and ontology by the subjective, as opposed to the objective, method of philosophizing. It will be found that the results which the author arrives at are similar. The epistemological problem is developed in the Organon from the consideration of the function of experience in scientific knowledge. All knowledge, the author argues, is not empirical; for this would give only historical enumeration. In scientific knowledge individual empirical cognitions are synthesized into a systematic unity. Such scientific cognitions as the laws of physics or the theorems of mathematics, have as their basis simple, homogeneous concepts, such as time, space, solidity, etc. Many of these correspond to the primary qualities of Locke. These are non-contradictory, Lambert holds, since they are qualitatively heterogeneous with each other. Hence their representation involves their possibility. They are, therefore, independent of experience, or a priori; though experience is necessary in