Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/679

 HAT there are truths which are proof against scepticism, is a view widely entertained. Not only are mathematical axioms to be recognized as such; there are principles that refer to the nature of the mind, and the constitution of the universe in general, which are regarded as necessary beliefs. Passages to this effect from Reid, or Père Buffier, or Dr. McCosh need scarcely be quoted. Cardinal Newman holds that indefectible certitude is possible, and that in the interest of true religion “we need something higher than a balance of arguments.” Professor Caird also seems to be upholding the view that we are under necessity to construe the actual world in certain ways, when he says in the Introduction to his Critical Philosophy of Kant that “there are principles which scepticism does not and cannot assail”; or, similarly, that “scepticism ends in disclosing a fundamental belief, in relation to which it is impossible to be sceptical.”

On the other hand, many thinkers might be cited to whom such confidence appears baseless. Hume held that in regard to matters of fact intuitive or demonstrated certainty is impossible. Bishop Butler’s well-known maxim is that Probability is the guide of life. And the common doctrine of logicians, that the inductions of science do not pass beyond probability, has for its consequence a view regarding all matters of fact, which in important respects, resembles that of Hume. How far, then, have we certainty in knowledge? How far are we restricted to probability? A solution of this problem would be of value as a contribution to Logic, or the Psychology of man’s rational nature.

We shall first of all examine some of the commonly accepted certainties, with a view to testing their claims. One of the primary assurances is that which each man has of his own existence. The name of Descartes is so intimately associated