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50 of action is always thought of as established by some power in authority. Hence, as a second element, we must recognize the legislative will. (3) The rule of action is laid upon some person, i.e., upon a free will who may or may not conform to it. The freedom of the subject, or the possibility of nonconformity, is always contemplated in this sense of the term. This first typical form of the concept law involves, therefore, these three essential elements: uniformity in action, a legislative will, and freedom or the possibility of nonconformity on the part of the subject.

The Stoics, as we have seen, explained the natural order and necessity in the world as the expression of the will of universal Reason. They used the phrase 'law of nature' indifferently for the order in the physical world and for the principles of moral conduct. Now in the Stoic concept of law of nature as applied to the physical world, we find the element of uniformity of action as in the first form, the legislative will broadened into a universal Reason, but the third element, that of freedom, completely vanishes. In this case the law is not imposed upon persons who may or may not obey, but upon inert matter which always conforms to the law necessarily. Again, eliminating from this Stoic concept the second element, we have left the modern scientific idea of natural law. The legislative will and the possibility of nonconformity have disappeared, and there remains only the first element — uniformity in action. The metaphysical philosopher may still resort to an ultimate rational will to explain the order in nature, but the physicist, as such, uses the term law without any implication of a lawgiver. To him the law is the expression for the mode of action in things, not for something outside of things. It is simply the statement of the fact of a certain uniformity in nature. The general form of a law in physics is: Under certain conditions certain events always happen. This unexceptional validity of the physical law is its characteristic mark. Of the three essential elements in the jural sense of the term, we find only one in the physical law, viz., uniformity in action.

What, now, is the relation of the concept moral law to these two typical forms of law?