Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/554

540, also, of theological over philosophical modes of thought in the system of Christian ethics which forms the basis of our every-day moral standards, has tended to make us assume that moral notions are altogether peculiar and unique in their constitution, and that it is only by the use of metaphor that we can compare moral and sense pleasures. Modern science, however, in proportion as it teaches us to explain every event by referring it back to the preceding phenomena on which it depends, is, indirectly but surely, forcing us to recognize what a large measure of truth lay in the old Greek conception of the relation between the good and the beautiful.

That the praise we bestow upon the man whose actions are noble and good is justified by its effects upon the recipient and others, needs no proof. There are, perhaps, men whose moral stature is so lofty that the applause of their fellows is not needed, as their blame is not regarded, by them; but for the vast majority the moral judgment of their equals is a wholesome influence, constantly checking the lower impulses, and restraining from at least open indulgence in wrong doing, while stimulating and encouraging the striving after that which is lovely and of good report. It is, therefore, perfectly reasonable for the determinist to praise the conduct that he believes to be beneficial to society, since his praise is to some extent helpful in the production of such conduct. Not only is praise, then, the expression of the recognition of what is morally beautiful and admirable, but it is a power which, well directed, makes for righteousness. And what is true of praise is still more evidently true of more substantial forms of reward. The determinists' position, that the man under given conditions must necessarily be just what he is, does not render it illogical to praise his character and reward his conduct.

Now let us look at the case of demerit. Here the same line of argument holds good. The vicious man and the vicious act are repugnant to our moral feelings. Just in so far as we are moralized, in so far as we have advanced to a relatively high stage of ethical development, are cowardice, deception, cruelty, and lust abhorrent to our souls. They are to the moral sense