Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/48

34 which therefore we describe by such names as chance, accident, fortune. On these grounds Hegesias contended that man is not sufficient of himself to secure pleasure or avoid pain at will, and that complete happiness is consequently beyond his reach.

But this conclusion must obviously alter the general law of conduct enjoined in hedonistic Ethics. If happiness be unattainable, then it may still be legitimate to hold that it is the highest good in the abstract; but it can no longer be wise to make happiness the object of pursuit as if it were actually to be reached. The wise man, instead of exposing himself to disappointment by endeavoring to realize an impossible ideal, will be content with the more modest success of avoiding unnecessary pain. This has, in modern literature, become the practical maxim, not only of pessimists like Schopenhauer, but also of hedonists like Bain; and it is an evidence of the logical clearness of Hegesias, that he saw so long ago the necessity of thus modifying the supreme maxim of Hedonism.

But, as Mr. Sully has pointed out, this modification is not the only alternative: another maxim is conceivable. If there be nothing in life worth living for but happiness, and if this be unattainable, then it obviously becomes a question whether life is worth living at all. If the only practicable good is to avoid pain, does it not follow that the wisest course is to escape from the very possibility of suffering by the most expeditious euthanasia? This inference, too, was apparently seen by Hegesias to be a reasonable alternative for the hedonist.

It thus appears that this old thinker had grasped all the essential issues of Hedonism and Pessimism. At all events it is a fact of philosophical significance that, away back at the very origin of Hedonism as a theory of the moral life, it became distinctly associated with Pessimism. The fact points not merely to a fortuitous association in history, but to an inevitable connection in logical thought; and therefore it may help us more clearly to estimate the value of Hedonism as a solution of the problems presented by the moral life of the world.

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