Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/40

26 account of his philosophy, — is that of Diogenes Laërtius. As it is brief, it may be worth while to give it in full:

"Those who are called Hegesiacs hold that the ends of action are the same, viz., pleasure and pain, and that there is no such thing in reality as gratitude or friendship or benevolence, because we choose these things, not for their own sakes, but on account of the uses which they serve, so that, if there is no use for them, they have no existence: that happiness is wholly unattainable; for, on the one hand, the body is filled to the full measure with many sufferings, and, on the other hand, the soul suffe's with the body and is thus disturbed, while fortune prevents many things from turning out according to expectation, so that from these causes happiness does not really exist: that life and death are both desirable. They held the theory that nothing is pleasant or unpleasant in its own nature, but that, by reason of want or novelty or satiety, some men are pleased, while some are unpleasantly affected: that poverty and riches, in relation to pleasure, are of no account, for rich and poor are not pleased in different ways: that slavery, equally with freedom, is a matter of indifference, when measured by the standard of pleasure; and so is high birth equally with low birth, and renown equally with obscurity: that, for the fool, life has some advantages, but for the prudent man it is a matter of indifference: that the wise man will do every action for his own sake; for he will hold that no other man is worthy of equal consideration with himself, and that, even if it appear that the greatest benefits can be derived from some other person, these are not equivalent to those which he himself may procure. They took away also our faith in sensations, on the ground that these do not give accurate knowledge; and they held that we must be guided in our actions only by what appears probable. They taught that faults should meet with forgiveness, for a man does wrong, not voluntarily, but under the impulse of some passion; and that therefore we should not hate, but rather teach, him: that the wise man will not be so much absorbed in the pursuit