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378  is terefore likely to be gladly welcomed. The attractive title of this book might lead one to expect a scientific discussion of logical problems, but this is far from the author's purpose. He supposes himself in possession of a short and easy method of solving not only logical questions, but almost all the other problems relating to the universe and man. The metaphysical basis of his system, which he calls Substantialism, is a modified Berkeleyanism. The nature of these modifications may be best shown by a few quotations. "The substantial mind consists of two principal parts — a Self and a Plasma — the Atman and the Akasa of Sanscrit philosophers" (p. 4). "The demiurgic mind is inconceivably greater and more powerful than the human, but it is not necessarily better in quality. It is the origin of all natural forces, and its organic processes are what we term 'physical laws'" (p. ). "The consciousness pertaining to the plasma left in its primitive state is Sentiment, which generally corresponds to what is termed the moral nature of man" (p. 11). The author does not appear to make any distinction between logical and psychological processes. He declares that the syllogism is based on classification, and that its conclusions are mere tautologies. But yet he maintains that "every argument consists in bringing a case under a precedent and applying to the case ideally the better knowledge possessed of the precedent" (p. 74). The case must resemble the precedent, but Mr. McLachlan does not inform us how great the similarity must be before we are justified in subsuming the one under the other. For a Substantialist the categories are of great importance, and the author mentions six, two of which, Inherence and Association, depend upon the Noumenal Mind, and are called Natural. The other four, Perspection, Concretion, Sequence, Causation, are artificial categories, and are formed by the Subjective mind. The latter part of the work treats of the Redaction of Colloquial Arguments, Fallacies, Academical Dialectic, etc. A sympathetic reader might be able to find much that is admirable, although old, implied in the author's somewhat obscure phraseology.

J. E. C.

This treatise is a reply to the Inaugural address with which Professor Exner entered upon the rectorship of the University of Vienna in October, 1891. It has, however, considerable general interest, both on account of the importance of the questions which it discusses and of the valuable services which Professor Brentano has already rendered to Philosophy. It was claimed in the Inaugural address that philosophical interest had greatly declined, and that the activity of the present age was non-productive and concerned itself exclusively with the systems of the past. Philosophy, in short, is really defunct, and since it is not a practical necessity,