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Rh of the ancient world, fails even to mention the name of Hegesias. In fact, Mr. Sully seems to hold that, while Pessimism can be logically developed from an ascetic system like that of the Cynics and Stoics, it is intrinsically inconsistent with the fundamental assumption of the Cyrenaic creed. It is true that this statement is somewhat qualified afterwards by the explanation, that "even if happiness be shown to be illusory, the affirmation of happiness as the one true end is not in the least gainsaid." But, even with this qualification, Mr. Sully's contention is, that "the supreme injunction" of Hedonism would require to be modified, if the ideal to which it points were declared to be unattainable under the actual conditions of human existence. The modification of hedonistic doctrine, which Mr. Sully holds to be logically necessitated by its association with Pessimism, is, as we shall find, precisely that which was adopted by Hegesias and his followers. It is therefore the more remarkable that Mr. Sully should not have given a place in his sketch to this ancient pessimist, who is thus rendered all the more interesting by his having apparently carried out what Mr. Sully conceived to be the issues of Pessimism more logically than many another adherent of the system.

Substantially all our knowledge of Hegesias is limited to two meagre sources, — a passage in Diogenes Laërtius (II 93), and another in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (I 34). There is indeed a brief account of Hegesias in two or three sentences of Epiphanius, Expositio Fidei (1089 B), but it is simply a valueless abridgment of the information given by Diogenes. A sentence also in Valerius Maximus (VIII 9, ext. 3) cites the influence of Hegesias' lectures in Alexandria to illustrate the effect of eloquence, but the passage only repeats in briefer form the story told by Cicero.

The principal account of Hegesias, then, — in fact, the only