Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/381

No. 3.] and as there is less unanimity in the belief. In the affirmation of the existence, independent of our consciousness, which we attribute to the physical world and other beings like ourselves, we obey a strong causal determination. The element of will is small, therefore, and the belief is universal. In religious beliefs a strong effort of will is required, and the beliefs are in consequence less general. Metaphysical belief may be justified despite the theoretic illusion it involves. In the case of sensation we have a legitimate affirmation of the reality of that which can never be an object of thought. Further, metaphysical belief, being produced by the principle of indetermination in the will, is not without its foundation in reality. This principle, though unlike any other source of knowledge, has its value. Objection may be taken to the assumption of two opposed kinds of truth. All that is necessary, however, is to reduce them to a superior term. As reality contains simultaneously the determined and the undetermined, which oppose without excluding one another, so it allows room for two affirmations, the one practical the other theoretical. Both are founded on reality, though on different aspects of it, and, though seemingly contradictory, are really complementary. As belief deals with what is beyond consciousness, it can establish nothing new. No new duties can be founded on it, and morality is established independently of it. It strengthens morality, however, and increases activity by bringing before the mind a large number of new facts, such as the past, the future, and other centres of existence. This is its justification. As the element of free will becomes greater, however, general reasons of the practical order fail, and the vivacity of practical interest must be a sufficient justification of belief. It would be absurd to justify beliefs by the single fact that they are willed. Justifiable belief must be the expression of exceptional intensity not feebleness of will. Those due to caprice and slavish submission to authority are therefore illegitimate. Fanaticism, being the slavery of the mind to a fixed idea, cannot give rise to justifiable belief. We can thus be satisfied with the results of the twofold movement of philosophy. The theoretical deviates progressively from ordinary opinion and narrows the world of matter and of spirit to two facts of consciousness. The practical returns to ordinary opinion, and enlarges the field of existence. This return, though a confirmation, at the same time makes possible a rectification. The two movements are necessary and complementary.

.